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NOTE
A MODEST PROPOSAL:
LEVERAGING PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS AND
THE BAYH-DOLE ACT TO REDUCE
DRUG PRICES IN THE U.S.
HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY
BRITTANY N. DAY*

INTRODUCTION
In 2017, Alec Smith, a Type 1 diabetic, aged out of his mother’s
health insurance plan when he turned twenty-six.1 He was dead a
month later, likely because he was attempting to ration his insulin until
he could afford to buy more at his next payday.2 Alec had a job as a
restaurant manager, but even with his salary of $35,000, he still could
not afford his insulin, which would have cost him $1,300 per month.3
Unfortunately, his salary was too high to qualify for Medicaid
assistance or other similar subsidies, but too low to be able to afford
health insurance without a prohibitively high deductible.4 Not all
stories involving high insulin prices involve deadly consequences, but
the impacts can be severe. Laura Marston, a thirty-six-year-old woman
with Type 1 diabetes, lost her job at a law firm.5 Without health
Copyright © 2021 Brittany N. Day
* J.D., Duke University School of Law, 2022; A.B., Duke University, 2019. I am grateful to my
professor, Arti Rai, for her guidance on this piece. I would also like to thank the Duke Journal of
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1. Bram Sable-Smith, Insulin’s High Cost Leads to Lethal Rationing, NPR (Sept. 1, 2018,
8:35 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/09/01/641615877/insulins-high-costleads-to-lethal-rationing.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Ritu Prasad, The Human Cost of Insulin in America, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2019),
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insurance, she was spending $2,880 per month on insulin.6 In order to
move to Washington, D.C. to find a new job to afford her insulin, she
had to sell most of her possessions and give up her dog.7
These stories are not uncommon for diabetics in the United States
who need to buy insulin monthly to survive. Insulin controls blood
sugar levels, and an insulin imbalance can have deadly consequences.
The discoverers of insulin recognized the importance of the hormone
and its life-saving potential, selling the patent for one dollar in 1923 so
everyone could benefit from it.8 But their vision for the drug has not
materialized; instead, insulin costs an average of $300 per vial.9
The federal government has recognized that changes in market
prices for drugs can have dire consequences. Insulin is not the only drug
with prohibitive prices in recent years.10 Unlike other patented
products, when drug prices skyrocket—due to the monopoly power of
patents or otherwise—people may die. While advocating for various
solutions, both the Biden and Trump administrations have recognized
the importance of halting the rise of prescription drug prices.11 Most of
the solutions advanced are focused on government-side initiatives, such
as allowing Medicare to directly negotiate with pharmaceutical
companies.12 Yet, the march-in rights built into the Bayh-Dole Act13
create an opportunity to set up a mechanism that would invite private
actors to sue pharmaceutical companies for unconscionable drug
pricing.14
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47491964.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-281, PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS: U.S. PRICES FOR SELECTED BRAND DRUGS WERE HIGHER ON AVERAGE THAN PRICES
IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND FRANCE (2021).
11. See American Patients First: The Trump Administration Blueprint to Lower Drug Prices
and Reduce Out-of-Pocket Costs, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., 3 (May 2018),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/AmericanPatientsFirst.pdf (“One of my greatest priorities
is to reduce the price of prescription drugs.”) [hereinafter Trump Administration Blueprint];
Healthcare, BIDEN HARRIS DEMOCRATS, https://joebiden.com/healthcare/ (last visited May 7,
2021) (listing multiple reforms to reduce the power of drug companies to abusively price drugs)
[hereinafter Biden Harris Reforms].
12. See Trump Administration Blueprint, supra note 11, at 10 (proposing Medicare reform
to give plan sponsors the ability to negotiate with manufacturers); Biden Harris Reforms, supra
note 11 (proposing ending regulations that permit drug corporations to avoid negotiating with
government healthcare plans).
13. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200–211).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2018) (giving the government the ability to require the licensee who
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The United States has a penchant for private litigation.15 Unlike
Europe, which largely regulates ex ante through centralized
bureaucracies, the United States tends to rely on ex post law
enforcement through private litigation.16 Although private
enforcement can be ad hoc and uneven, it provides an avenue for
redress when regulation has failed and gives the party with the
informational advantage control over litigation.17 The United States
has tried to create a robust system of ex ante regulation in the form of
the Food and Drug Administration, but there are several regimes of
private enforcement that work to capture inefficiencies in the health
industry.
As described in detail in this Note, Congress has invited private
parties into the courts to regulate various aspects of the healthcare
industry through Paragraph IV litigation from the Hatch-Waxman Act,
qui tam litigation aimed at Medicare and Medicaid fraud, and antitrust
litigation. Taken together, these private enforcement mechanisms work
to moderate drug prices, reduce fraud in healthcare billing, and ensure
a healthy, competitive pharmaceutical market. Although each of these
mechanisms has weaknesses, they operate to regulate a field where
blanket regulation from a federal agency may not be workable or
efficient. In doing so, the interests of private parties are brought closer
to that of the government, effectively harnessing “selfish” private
actors for the public good.
A similar mechanism of private enforcement should be
implemented to control the prohibitive drug pricing in the United
States. The Bayh-Dole Act includes a provision that reserves march-in
rights to federal agencies if the companies that obtain patents funded
by federal research do not meet certain criteria.18 Although these
march-in rights have never been exercised,19 they provide an already
existing statutory mechanism to control runaway drug prices. One of
the weaknesses of the current march-in rights is uncertainty over the

acquired title under the Act to grant a license to a “responsible applicant,” and if refused, to grant
the license itself based upon a specified set of criteria).
15. See 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *161 (noting that the “common informer”
advances the public interest).
16. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2012).
17. Id. at 1155–56.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 203.
19. JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44597, MARCH-IN RIGHTS UNDER THE
BAYH-DOLE ACT 8 (2016).
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criteria for exercising them.20 Congress should amend the Bayh-Dole
Act to clarify the criteria for the march-in rights by listing factors to
define when drug prices are unreasonable or unconscionable. Congress
should additionally let qui tam relators bring suits to obtain licenses to
manufacture and sell drugs at a lower price should a court find the
newly set-out criteria have been violated.
By allowing a private party to initiate and carry out the litigation,
the private interests of the qui tam relator can be brought into
alignment with the public good. When a manufacturer has a monopoly
on a brand name drug, other companies have an interest in breaking
that monopoly and obtaining some of the market by offering the drug
at a lower price. Offering the lower-priced alternative also serves the
public good. Furthermore, downstream effects triggered by the
initiation of the march-in rights litigation would cause companies to
consider the factors laid out in the legislation when setting drug prices
in the future. Eventually, drug prices could drop to more reasonable
levels to avoid unnecessary and potentially costly litigation.
Part I of this Note explores recent drug price increases and offers
some of the reasons behind them. Part II will provide a history of
private enforcement in the United States, as well as a closer look at the
three private enforcement mechanisms that create a system of ex post
regulation for the healthcare industry. Part III will summarize the
history and congressional intent behind the Bayh-Dole Act. Part IV will
lay out the proposed private enforcement mechanisms in relation to the
Bayh-Dole Act march-in rights, taking into account the failures and
weaknesses of the current private enforcement mechanisms.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. HEALTHCARE PRICING
The United States healthcare system is one of the most expensive
in the world. In 2009, the U.S. spent a total of $2.47 trillion on health
expenditures.21 Prescription drugs specifically are the fastest growing
portion of national health expenditures, increasing “from 5.8 percent in
1993 to 10.7 percent in 2003.”22 The increasing prices of brand name
20. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., SPECIAL PUB. NO.
1234, RETURN ON INVESTMENT INITIATIVE TO ADVANCE THE PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT
AGENDA:
FINAL
GREEN
PAPER
32
(2019),
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.1234.pdf (finding stakeholder
uncertainty as to the scope of march-in rights leads to market uncertainty).
21. D. Christopher Ohly & Sailesh K. Patel, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Prescriptions for
Innovative and Inexpensive Medicines, 19 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 107, 121 (2011).
22. Id.
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drugs, more so than generics, drain the bank accounts of everyday
Americans, as generic drugs cost on average about half that of brand
name drugs.23 While brand name drug prices increased by 28.9 percent
in a five-year period, generic drug prices only increased, on average, by
9.4 percent during that time.24
Brand name drugs have rapidly increased in price, and inflation
cannot fully explain the pace. A report found that the list prices of 600
brand name drugs rose by a median of 21.4 percent between January
2018 and June 2020.25 Another study found that from 2005 to 2017, the
318 most widely used drug products in the AARP combined market
basket increased in price by 203.4 percent.26 Although inflation may be
the cause for some of the price increases, many drug price increases
outpaced inflation from 2006 to 2017.27 Between July 2018 and July
2019, 50 percent of drugs covered by Medicare Part D had price
increases that outpaced inflation.28 Furthermore, for the drugs
accounting for the most Part D spending in 2019, twenty-two of the
twenty-five drugs had prices that increased faster than inflation,
between a 3 percent and 19.7 percent increase compared with an
inflation rate of 1.8 percent.29
Chairman Elijah Cummings of the House Oversight Committee
launched an investigation into the high costs of prescription
medication, which resulted in a series of reports in late 2020 focusing
on a few drugs with astronomical prices.30 The reports collectively paint
23. Id. at 122.
24. Id.
25. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM, 116TH CONG., DRUG PRICING
INVESTIGATION: CELGENE AND BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB—REVLIMID 38 (2020),
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/Celgene%20BMS%20Staff
%20Report%2009-30-2020.pdf (citing STATE OF CALIFORNIA, OFFICE OF STATEWIDE HEALTH
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, Prescription Drug Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC) Increases
(Aug. 17, 2020), oshpd.ca.gov/visualizations/prescriptiondrug-wholesale-acquisition-costincreases/).
26. Stephen W. Schondelmeyer & Leigh Purvis, Trends in Retail Prices of Prescription
Drugs Widely Used by Older Americans: 2017 Year-End Update, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., 7
(Sept.
2019),
https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/ppi/2019/09/trends-in-retail-prices-ofprescription-drugs-widely-used-by-older-americans.doi.10.26419-2Fppi.00073.003.pdf.
27. Id.
28. Juliette Cubanski & Tricia Neuman, Price Increases Continue to Outpace Inflation for
Many Medicare Part D Drugs, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/price-increases-continue-to-outpace-inflation-formany-medicare-part-d-drugs/.
29. Id.
30. Investigation of Skyrocketing Prescription Drug Prices, HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT
REFORM,
https://oversight.house.gov/investigations/investigation-of-skyrocketingAND
prescription-drug-prices (last visited May 7, 2021), reports can be found at
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a picture of aggressive revenue targets, manipulation of patents to
extend exclusivity, and an overly burdened United States healthcare
system that is forced to pay prices far above those in Europe. Whenever
a company raises drug prices, the result is deadweight loss—people who
could afford the fair market price of the drug are priced out.31 This
deadweight loss arises because companies have monopolies over
patented drugs, barring substitutes from the market.32 Yet, with drug
monopolies, pricing out could mean that someone cannot afford lifesaving medication.33 Unfortunately, deadweight loss in healthcare
means dead people.
The unusual demand curve for prescription drugs lets companies
increase drug prices without losing customers. Unlike normal economic
pricing, under which demand for a new product falls after a prolonged
period of time—and the price for the product will likely drop even with
a monopoly—prescription drugs have an almost unlimited demand
curve.34 Drug companies take advantage of this unlimited curve by
implementing drug price increases that far outstrip inflation.35
Furthermore, research and development (R&D) costs of the drugs
cannot account for the astronomical price increases.36 Instead, drug
companies increase prices on a whim—as Celgene’s former Senior Vice
President quipped “anytime they want[]”37—and in response to
aggressive revenue targets set by executives.38 Doing so allows drug
companies to lean on the United States healthcare system to pick up
slack from the European healthcare system,39 where drug prices are
generally tightly controlled.40
Patents confer a set period of market exclusivity for drugs, but
https://oversight.house.gov/news/reports.
31. See Hannah Brennan et al., A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging
Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 275, 293–98 (2016) (explaining the
effects of deadweight loss in the pharmaceutical industry).
32. Id. at 294.
33. See id. at 297 (describing the loss in human welfare from high drug prices).
34. Id. at 295.
35. See Cubanksi & Neuman, supra note 28 (describing price increases relative to inflation
rates for Medicare Part D drugs).
36. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM, 116TH CONG., DRUG PRICING
INVESTIGATION CELGENE AND BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB—REVLIMID ii (2020) (noting how cost
decisions of Revlimid did not correspond with research and development on the drug).
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id. at 7.
39. See id. at 12 (showing the price of Revlimid remained steady in the European Union
while increasing in price in the United States).
40. See generally Christine Leopold et al., Differences in External Price Referencing in
Europe – A Descriptive Overview, 104 HEALTH POL’Y 50 (2012).
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companies exploit gray areas in the law to both extend that exclusivity
farther than they may otherwise receive and ensure their higher-priced
brand name drug is still prescribed even when lacking market
exclusivity. Drug companies tend to layer patents on top of their
prescription drugs in order to extend market exclusivity, a process
known colloquially as “evergreening.”41 The danger of this practice is
that drug companies may extend their market exclusivity for a drug far
beyond the twenty-year period usually attached to a patent, giving
them the opportunity to raise their drug prices uninhibited for longer.42
Drug companies also attempt to stop generic companies from entering
the market at the end of the exclusivity period by using the restrictions
surrounding the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies to prevent
generics from getting samples of brand name drugs to reverse
engineer.43
Even once drug companies have lost their market exclusivities, they
engage in practices to keep prices high—such as lobbying doctors to
prescribe brand name drugs and contracting with health plans and
pharmacy benefit managers.44 These companies also often market a
new drug dosage combined with increasing the price of the old dosage
to force patients back onto the patent-protected drug.45 In
acknowledgement of the high drug prices, pharmaceutical companies
also pay into funds that provide co-pay assistance to patients,
leveraging brand name loyalty to ensure patients will ask to be
prescribed their favorite brands even with the prohibitive costs.46
The government is not blind to these issues, and rules and
legislation have been proposed to address the issue.47 The Trump

41. C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective
Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 327–328 (Mar. 2012).
42. See id. at 328 (describing how companies use the patent system to prevent generic drugs
from entering the market).
43. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS. ENG’G MED., MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A
NATIONAL IMPERATIVE, 40 (Norman R. Augustine et al., eds., 2018).
44. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM, 116TH CONG., DRUG PRICING
INVESTIGATION NOVARTIS—GLEEVEC ii (2020).
45. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM, 116TH CONG., DRUG PRICING
INVESTIGATION TEVA—COPAXONE iv (2020).
46. Id. at ii–iii.
47. Unfortunately, the transition to the Biden administration seems to have slowed, and
maybe even reversed, the initiatives supported by Trump. See Merle DeLancey, Jr., Biden
Administration Already Impacting Drug Prices, JDSUPRA (Feb. 17, 2021),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/biden-administration-already-impacting-2691434/ (outlining
the Biden administration’s response to Trump’s executive orders and regulations related to drug
pricing).
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administration pushed several rules designed to lower Medicare
spending on prescriptions drugs.48 One interim rule issued in November
2020 implemented the Most Favored Nation (MFN) model for
Medicare Part B spending, which sets Medicare reimbursement at the
lowest price paid by member countries of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).49 Another rule
would have eliminated rebates between drug manufacturers and
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and allowed drug companies to
give discounts to patients directly.50 Finally, the Trump administration
issued a rule that created ways to import drugs from other countries.51
The innovation did not stop with the Trump administration.
The Biden administration recently supported a proposal to cap
drug price increases at the rate of inflation.52 Any price increase that
outstrips inflation would require the drug manufacturer to pay a rebate
to the federal government.53 The bill also would set up Medicare drug
price negotiation, wherein the federal government could leverage its
purchasing power to negotiate lower prices for Medicare Part D.54 The
CBO estimates that this proposal could save around $450 billion over
a period of 9 years.55 The proposal was included in H.R.3, which was
passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate Finance
Committee in the 116th Congress.56 In the Republican-controlled
Senate, however, the bill was not brought up for a floor vote.57 In the
117th Congress, H.R.3 was again re-introduced, although it has not yet
been brought to the Floor for a vote.58
48. Id. (discussing Trump administration executive orders that aspired to effect drug prices).
49. Kenneth Yood, et al., Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American
Economy: The Biden Administration Considers Drug Pricing Strategies While Keeping the “Most
Favored Nations” Drug Reimbursement Program on the Sidelines, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW
(Aug. 20, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/executive-order-promoting-competitionamerican-economy-biden-administration.
50. DeLancey, Jr., supra note 47. Again, the rule was delayed due to a lawsuit and the fate
of the rule is in the Biden administration’s hands.
51. Id.
52. Cubanski & Neuman, supra note 28.
53. Id.
54. See Juliette Cubanski et al., What’s the Latest on Medicare Drug Price Negotiations?,
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Jul. 23, 2021), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/whatsthe-latest-on-medicare-drug-price-negotiations/ (discussing H.R. 3 and Medicare negotiation
under the Biden administration).
55. Id.
56. Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act, H.R. 3, 116th Cong. (2019).
57. Cubanski & Neuman, supra note 28.
58. H.R.3 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3 (last visited Nov. 11,
2021).
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This solution only touches a small portion of insured Americans,
namely those covered under Medicare. In 2019, 18.1 percent of the U.S.
population was covered under Medicare.59 On the other hand, 68.5
percent of the U.S. population was covered by plans in the private
health insurance market.60 An additional 19.8 percent of individuals
were covered under Medicaid.61 Those on private health insurance and
the uninsured also need a solution addressing drug prices.
II. A HISTORY OF U.S. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
The United States has a rich history of encouraging private
litigation to support its ex ante regulation from Congress and
agencies.62 During the New Deal era, Congress attempted to set up a
“bureaucracy-centered enforcement regime” that gave agencies the
primary investigatory power to find and prevent wrongdoing.63 The
system, however, still left a lot of responsibility for ex post regulation
to the common law tort regime.64 During the twentieth century,
Congress intentionally gave more power to the private enforcement
system by implementing mechanisms such as private rights of action in
statutes.65 Many reasons have been put forth to explain this
development, including both a pervasive doubt in the government’s
ability to properly regulate, and cynical accusations of a lazy
government—seeking credit for policies but shirking from the
responsibility of monitoring the price and complexities of
implementing said regulations.66
Delegating the regulatory power to the courts also provides a stable
system of interpretation and ensures staying power once those
interpretations have been set. Courts and judges are “subject to strong
institutional norms that render judicial interpretation more stable and
consistent over time than interpretation by successive political
59. RYAN J. ROSSO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10830, US HEALTH CARE COVERAGE AND
SPENDING 1 (2021).
60. Id.
61. Id. It is important to note there may be possible dual enrollment overlap between
Medicare and Medicaid.
62. See Glover, supra note 16, at 1147 (“[T]he primacy of ex post private enforcement . . . is
in large part an outgrowth of America’s inherited regulatory design, which relied largely on
private suits brought pursuant to common law doctrines, as opposed to ex ante public regulation
of wrongdoing by governmental bodies.”).
63. Id. (quoting Sean Farhang, The Political Development of Job Discrimination Litigation,
1963-1976, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 23, 24 (2009)).
64. Id. at 1147–48.
65. Id. at 1148.
66. Id. at 1151–52.
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administrations.”67 By explicitly giving courts the authority to interpret
and implement legislation, Congress ensures the regulation will not be
swayed or distorted by the next presidential administration. The private
enforcement model also provides several advantages over public
enforcement, such as ensuring an informational advantage to the party
enforcing the right and preventing a geographically distant agency
regulating from afar.68
The healthcare field is unique in this broader system of private
enforcement because Congress has explicitly provided a strict form of
ex ante agency regulation through the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, which authorizes the FDA to regulate drugs.69 The FDA,
however, makes clear that the goal of the ex ante regulation is to reduce
physical harm to patients by ensuring the safety of the drugs on the
marketplace in the United States.70 The private enforcement
mechanisms that surround the healthcare system serve to pick up the
slack in economic regulation, including a system to promote generic
entry to reduce drug prices and qui tam relators to reduce healthcare
fraud for the U.S. government.
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act and Generic Drug Entry
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, regulates generic drug entry
into the marketplace by providing an easier avenue for FDA approval
and a private enforcement mechanism to challenge patents held by
brand name companies.71 The purpose of the Act is to “make available
more low-cost generic drugs by establishing a generic drug approval
process for pioneer drugs.”72 Before the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic

67. Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and
Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1247
(2002).
68. See Glover, supra note 16, at 1155–1158 (describing several areas of private enforcement
where agencies are not the ideal party to enforce a right).
69. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i (2018).
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we70. See
What
We
Do,
FDA,
do#:~:text=Freedom%20of%20Information,FDA%20Mission,and%20products%20that%20emit%20radiation (last visited May 7, 2021)
(“The Food and Drug Administration is responsible for protecting the public health by ensuring
the safety, efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, and medical
devices”).
71. See Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 355 (2018)) (discussing the approval process for new drugs and providing for a thirty
month stay if an action challenging the patent is brought within forty-five days).
72. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 14 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647.
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drug companies were required to perform independent clinical drug
trials to earn FDA approval.73 Even though it was undeniably for
“society’s benefit to introduce generic versions of . . . drugs . . . as quickly
as possible,” there was no easy pathway for generic companies to get
approval.74
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic drug manufacturers can file
an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), which relies on the
clinical trials conducted and data collected by a brand name drug
manufacturer to get FDA approval.75 A key requirement is that the
generic drug manufacturer proves the generic has the same active
ingredient as, and is the “bioequivalence” of, the proposed product to a
branded drug.76 The new entry mechanisms for generic manufacturers
were balanced with greater protection for brand name drug
manufacturers in several ways, such as a patent term extension of up to
five years,77 up to five years of data exclusivity,78 and a thirty-month stay
as a result of Paragraph IV litigation.79
The Hatch-Waxman Act also invites litigation through a
mechanism in Paragraph IV. Known as “Paragraph IV Certification,” a
generic firm seeking market entry must confirm there are no patent
rights preventing market entry.80 In doing so, the generic company
certifies that any existing patents are “invalid or will not be infringed
by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the
application is submitted.”81 Once generic companies have made this
certification, brand name drug companies will often sue the filer for
patent infringement.82 The first ANDA filer also receives a 180-day
73. Alfred Engelberg, Unaffordable Prescription Drugs: The Real Legacy of the HatchWaxman Act, STAT (Dec. 16, 2020) https://www.statnews.com/2020/12/16/unaffordableprescription-drugs-real-legacy-hatch-waxmanact/#:~:text=Before%20Hatch%2DWaxman,branded%20medicines%20enjoyed%20perpetual
%20monopolies.
74. Ohly & Patel, supra note 21, at 111 (quoting Hasneen Karbalai, The Hatch-Waxman
ACCESS
TO
SCHOLARSHIP
AT
HARVARD,
(Im)Balancing
Act,
DIGITAL
https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/10015297 (last accessed October 8, 2021)).
75. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1)-(2) (2018).
76. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2018).
77. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c), (g)(6) (2018).
78. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (c)(3)(E)(ii) (2018).
79. Id. § 355 (c)(3)(C) (2018).
80. Id. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2018).
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., AstraZeneca Pharms. LP v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26196, No. 02 Civ. 7936 (WHP), at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2005)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 467 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(discussing how the patent holder pharmaceutical company brought suit for patent infringement
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exclusivity against other generic drug manufacturers,83 which
encourages and invites this system of private litigation.
Studies have shown that Paragraph IV litigation has proven
successful in increasing generic drug market entry and decreasing
health spending.84 Prior to the Act, because of the lengthy and
expensive process to get generic drug approval, only 35 percent of
drugs with an expired patent had a generic equivalent.85 In 2020, with
the easier approval process and automatic substitution at the pharmacy
for generics, generic drugs were 90 percent of all dispensed
prescriptions while only accounting for 20 percent of drug spending.86
Furthermore, generics have generated $313 billion of drug savings.87
For consumers, the average copay for a generic drug was $6.97, and for
the brand name drug it was $56.32.88
Private litigation in this sphere has created two related issues that
have captured the attention of critics: evergreening and prospecting.
The issues are two sides of the same coin—evergreening is a practice
that extends market exclusivity, and prospecting is a practice that
shortens market exclusivity. Evergreening is the tendency of drug
manufacturers to pile weak patents on top of their active ingredient
patent in a bid to increase market exclusivity.89 On the other side, there
is the risk of prospecting, where generic brands over-challenge drug
patents, artificially shortening the life of the patent.90 While either side
of the coin likes to point fingers at the other, criticizing this push and
pull as a fundamental error in the system, the actions taken by both
sides to have better market positions is the type of behavior
inducement intended by Paragraph IV litigation. The public good is
served by incentivizing companies to challenge drugs, and although
that may lead to blockbuster drugs fielding more patent challenges,
after the generic company filed an ANDA).
83. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2018).
84. See Ohly & Patel, supra note 21, at 117 (stating an FTC study found 73% of generic drug
manufacturers won patent litigation between 1992 and June 2002).
85. Garth Boehm et al., Development of the Generic Drug Industry in the US After the
Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, 3 ACTA PHARMACEUTICA SINICA B 297, 298 (2013).
86. 2020 Generic Drug & Biosimilars Access & Savings in the U.S. Report, ASSOCIATION
FOR ACCESSIBLE MEDICINES 1, 16 (2020), https://accessiblemeds.org/sites/default/files/202009/AAM-2020-Generics-Biosimilars-Access-Savings-Report-US-Web.pdf.
87. Id. at 4.
88. Id. at 17.
89. Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 41, at 330.
90. See id. at 333 (describing a study which found that the market life for drugs making more
than $500 million is 12.7 years, whereas those drugs which make less than $50 million have a
market life of 15.1 years).
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those challenges serve to limit the negative effects of evergreening. The
system preserves only the strongest patents, which are meant to protect
valuable drugs, while the weaker fall in favor of generics. This process
will ultimately lower drug prices.
Another currently unraveling issue is the potential antitrust liability
created by pay-for-delay settlements.91 Drug manufacturers are using
the creative solution of paying a settlement to generic manufacturers
so that they stay out of the market for a period of time.92 Because
monopoly pricing always exceeds duopoly pricing, and the first-filer for
ANDA applications has the exclusive right to generic challenges,93 the
drug manufacturer has an incentive to keep the first-filer out of the
field for a price. Pay-for-delay settlements are an example of
unintended consequences of private enforcement, where settlements
may lead to longer market exclusivities than without private
enforcement.94
B. Qui Tam Litigation and Healthcare Industry Fraud
The Civil False Claims Act (FCA) implements a system of qui tam
litigation to combat fraud in payment to the government.95 The Act
allows qui tam plaintiffs,96 known as relators, to bring a civil action for
any violation of the FCA and receive up to twenty-five percent of the
judgment or settlement.97 Under the FCA, relators bring civil actions
in the name of the government.98 The statute was drafted to place the
government in control of the prosecutions with the assistance of private
parties.99 When an action is filed by a relator, the action remains under
seal for sixty days while the government decides whether or not to

91. See generally Raymond J. Prince, Pay-For-Delay: How Brand-Name and Generic
Pharmaceutical Drug Companies Collude and Cost Consumers Billions, 68 S.C. L. REV. 689 (2017)
(providing an overview of pay-for-delay settlements in the pharmaceutical industry).
92. Id. at 693.
93. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2018).
94. See generally Prince, supra note 91 (providing an overview of pay-for-delay settlements
in the pharmaceutical industry).
95. Christina Orsini Broderick, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical
Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 952 (2007).
96. Qui tam comes from the Latin term “qui tam pro domino rege quam se ipso in hac parte
sequitur,” meaning “who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.” Qui tam action,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th ed. 2004).
97. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2018).
98. Id. § 3730(b)(1) (2018).
99. Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with Privatization of Public
Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 285–86 (2007).
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intervene.100 After the sixty days, the relator may proceed with the suit,
either with the government as prosecutor or with the government
actively monitoring the case.101
FCA claims have been on the rise recently, both generally and as to
healthcare fraud. Congress amended the FCA in 1986 to incentivize
relators to bring claims by making it easier for a relator to recover in
an action and making it safer to be a whistleblower as a relator.102
Furthermore, the Deficit Reductions Act of 2005 specifically requires
any entity making payments under State Medicaid plans to provide its
employees with information about the FCA.103 The number of qui tam
suits has risen dramatically since the amendment, from 32 suits in 1987,
to 533 in 1997,104 to 672 in 2020.105
The majority of recent FCA litigation has targeted the
pharmaceutical industry.106 In 2020, of the $2.2 billion recovered
through the FCA, $1.8 billion involved healthcare industry fraud.107
Overall, $1.6 billion was recovered specifically through qui tam suits.108
In the healthcare industry, FCA claims help to prevent money from
fraudulently flowing to private pharmaceutical companies.109 These
claims also effectively lower pharmaceutical drug prices by stopping
companies from illegally subsidizing co-pays to support their high drug
prices.110 Furthermore, kickback schemes and fraudulent payments can
100. Id. at 286.
101. Id. at 286–87.
102. See Broderick, supra note 95, at 954 (stating that the amendment allowed private parties
the right to continue as a party even after government intervention, increased the relator’s
recovery, and protected relators from retaliatory actions).
103. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(68)(A) (2018)). The Act also put into place incentives for states to pass false claims
acts similar to the FCA by allowing states 10 percent of any recovery under those laws. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396h(a). Currently, 21 states have approved laws under this statute. See State False Claims Act
Reviews, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL, https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/state-false-claims-act-reviews/ (last visited May 7, 2021)
(listing approved state laws).
104. Broderick, supra note 95, at 955.
105. Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department
Recovers Over $2.2 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2020 (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-22-billion-false-claims-actcases-fiscal-year-2020.
106. See id. (stating that $1.8 billion of the $2.2 billion recovered in Fiscal Year 2020 under
the FCA involved the healthcare industry).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. (describing a settlement with Novartis for $591 million to resolve claims relating
to kickbacks to induce prescriptions for Novartis drugs).
110. Id. (detailing two settlements with Novartis and Gilead which paid over $148 million to
resolve claims that they paid co-pays for the companies’ own drugs through supposedly
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lead to potentially poorer health outcomes by interfering with the
independent decision-making of healthcare professionals.111 Overall,
qui tam litigation in the pharmaceutical industry serves to regulate ex
post by uncovering behavior that, without private relators, might never
come to light.
Qui tam litigation is especially important when it regulates
industries with asymmetric information between the regulator and the
regulated party, such as in Medicare payment fraud.112 The aim of the
enforcement mechanism is to find the party with the most accurate
information at the lowest possible cost to the public, and hopefully
deter fraudulent behavior by increasing the likelihood of
punishment.113 In order to operate efficiently and with the lowest cost
to the public, the system should be designed to bring forward only the
highest quality suits. Yet, in practice that has not happened.114
When the government participates in a qui tam action, the parties
will likely receive a larger recovery than without government
intervention, leading to potential over-utilization of the qui tam
system.115 Despite the high number of frivolous qui tam lawsuits, the
government still recovers a significant amount of money, meaning the
qui tam provision still holds value as a way to find fraudulent activity.116
The number of government-initiated actions, however, has decreased
at the same rate qui tam suits have increased—suggesting a loss to the
public in the cost of having to investigate qui tam suits as private parties
when the government may have the capability of investigating these
actions on its own.117
Qui tam litigation also creates the issue of moral hazard by allowing
the government to benefit from private enforcement while letting
private relators shoulder the risk. The availability of private enforcers

independent foundations).
111. Id. (describing schemes which induced the purchase of good and services).
112. Anthony Casey & Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction: The Screening Value of Qui Tam,
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1178 (2014).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 1186 (stating that “increasing the rewards for informing or decreasing the
private cost of informing . . . dilutes the quality of the information brought forward”).
115. See Matthew, supra note 99, at 293 (finding that several FCA cases recently prosecuted
cost taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars, but were only questionably supported by the facts
of the case).
116. See Broderick, supra note 95, at 955 (finding the government had recovered $8.4 billion
from qui tam lawsuits over a period of less than twenty years).
117. Id. at 979.
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raises a significant risk of over-enforcement of the statute.118 Instead of
pursuing only the best and most reliable cases of fraud, the government
passively awaits case outcomes while private litigants bear the costs of
litigation.119 This leads to an increased number of lower quality lawsuits,
creating a schism between the original intent of the FCA and the
operation of the statute in reality.120 Therefore, although qui tam suits
may correct information imbalances when uncovering fraudulent
practices—especially in the healthcare industry—the field also suffers
from over-litigation and frivolous suits.
C. Private Antitrust and Potential Pharmaceutical Litigation
Federal antitrust law prohibits anticompetitive behavior under the
Sherman Act,121 inviting both private and public enforcement in court.
The Sherman Act Section 1 prohibits price fixing and collective
anticompetitive behavior.122 The Sherman Act Section 2 prohibits
monopolies and conspiracies to monopolize, as well as mergers that
have the risk of creating a monopoly.123 Enforcement power for these
sections lies with the United States government,124 state attorneys
general,125 and private parties who have been “injured in their business”
by behavior forbidden in the Sherman Act,126 affectionately known as
“private attorneys general.”127 Relatedly, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) can also enforce antitrust behavior under the
Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits similar antitrust
behavior as the Sherman Act.128
The Sherman Act incentivizes private enforcement by authorizing
treble damages for private lawsuits.129 Legislative history suggests the

118. Matthew, supra note 99, at 282.
119. Id. at 297-98.
120. Id.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
122. See id. (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal.”).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
124. Id. § 15f.
125. Id. § 15c.
126. Id. § 15.
127. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972).
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful”); see also
Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of Competition” in Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227 (1980).
129. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2018) (authorizing treble damages).
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Act was meant to compensate injured victims and prevent money from
flowing to firms with market power.130 In that way, treble damages are
meant as both an incentive for private parties and punitive damages for
trusts as a way to deter future anticompetitive behavior.131 Whatever
the motivation for treble damages, private enforcement is more
successful in deterring anticompetitive behavior than the suits brought
by the government.132
Antitrust enforcement specifically plays a critical role in regulating
pharmaceutical firms’ behavior in the healthcare industry.133 Two
potential avenues for future litigation regulating antitrust and
pharmaceutical companies are “product hopping”134 and pay-for-delay
settlements.135 Both have potential to increase drug prices and delay
generic entry and competition in the pharmaceutical industry.
Therefore, these practices are a future target for increased regulation
aimed at creating a more efficient healthcare industry.
Although it is unclear whether product hopping is a future avenue
for antitrust litigation, one exemplar case in the field precipitated by
private parties is Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Public
Limited Co.136 There, Mylan Pharmaceuticals sued Warner Chilcott and
Mayne Pharma under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for unlawful
monopoly activity related to Warner Chilcott’s actions with its drug,
Doryx.137 Warner Chilcott took a series of steps, known as “product
hopping,” to prevent generic drug substitution for Doryx by switching
130. Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33
ANTITRUST BULL. 429, 449 (1988) (noting that many statements were made by legislators which
positioned the Act as a way to stop the “robbery” of overcharges by antitrust firms, stating trusts
“extorted wealth” and have “stolen untold millions from the people”).
131. See Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement:
An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. Rev. 879, 883 (2008) (stating private enforcement treble
damages serve as a deterrent, but also may reflect “unawarded prejudgment interest, . . . difficultto-quantify unawarded damages items such as the allocative inefficiency effects of market power
and the value of plaintiffs’ time expended pursuing litigation”).
132. See id. at 905 (finding the forty private antitrust cases studied deterred anticompetitive
behavior more than any criminal fines or sentences imposed by the DOJ).
133. For an overview of the areas of antitrust enforcement related to pharmaceuticals, see
Michael A. Carrier, Antitrust in the Pharmaceutical Sector: An Overview of US Case Law,
CASE
LAWS
E-BULLETIN,
Oct.
8,
2018,
ANTITRUST
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/sinha/files/ssrn-id3269506.pdf (last visited May 7, 2021).
134. See generally Jessie Cheng, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471 (2008) (describing the practice of product
hopping in the pharmaceutical industry).
135. See generally Prince, supra note 91 (providing an overview of pay-for-delay settlements
in the pharmaceutical industry).
136. 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016).
137. Id. at 426.
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the drug from a capsule version to a tablet version.138 In doing so,
Warner Chilcott blocked its potential generic competitors from being
able to automatically substitute their already approved capsule drugs
with the new Doryx tablet formulation.139 The FTC filed an amicus
brief for the case in both the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals urging the
court to recognize antitrust liability for product hopping because of
harm to generic competition.140
The Third Circuit was unconvinced by the arguments for
anticompetitive behavior, holding the generic company still had other
available actions in the market they could have taken, such as
developing a tablet version before Doryx took the tablet off the
market.141 Furthermore, the court found that Warner Chilcott had
reasons other than pure anticompetitive behavior for the product
changes, including harmonization with European drug dosages.142
Though, here, the private enforcement failed to successfully enforce
antitrust laws for product hopping, the mechanism of private
enforcement can still lead to effective and targeted regulation for
pharmaceutical companies.
III. THE BAYH-DOLE ACT
Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 under Pub. L. 96-517,
Amendments to the Patent and Trademark Act to encourage
technological innovation.143 The Act allows a contractor to obtain a
patent developed with federal government support, which was
intended to incentivize private actors to commercialize federal R&D.144
By providing patent protection to private parties that develop and
commercialize products funded by federal money, the Bayh-Dole Act
both encourages innovations and promotes the public good by
138. Id. at 429.
139. Id.
140. See generally Brief for Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission Supporting PlaintiffAppellant, Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421 (E.D. Pa. 2015)
(No. 15-2236) (urging the court to recognize product hopping in the pharmaceutical industry as a
source for antitrust liability).
141. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 838 F.3d at 438.
142. Id. at 439.
143. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2018) (“It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent
system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or
development [and] to encourage maximum participation of small business firms in federally
supported research and development efforts.”).
144. Abigail Amato Rives, Reorienting Bayh-Dole’s March-In: Looking to Purpose and
Objectives in the Public’s Interest, 5 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 77, 85 (2013).

DAY_FINAL_NOTE_12.21.2021 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

LEVERAGING PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

1/26/2022 2:55 PM

69

increasing access to new inventions.145 In return, the government retains
a “nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license” for the
government’s own benefits,146 as well as “march-in rights” for federal
agencies.147 The march-in rights allow the government under certain
circumstances to force the private parties that own the patents granted
under the Act to grant a “nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or exclusive
license” to a “responsible applicant or applicants.”148
These march-in rights have never been exercised, despite six
petitions that have been submitted to the National Institutes of Health
(NIH).149 The differing opinions regarding the potential effect of
exercising march-in rights on the patent system has proven to be an
issue. Some believe march-in rights have the potential to stifle
innovation by discouraging investment in government-funded R&D.150
Others, however, believe the government should be able to protect
taxpayers from excessive pricing on products that have been developed
using public funding.151
The uncertainty of the statutory language and the pertinent
regulations for march-in rights is another issue. The Secretary of
Commerce delegated the authority to promulgate implementing
regulations of the Bayh-Dole Act to the Director of National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST), a primarily nonregulatory
body.152 The regulations that control the exercise of march-in rights only
require a fact-finding process and consideration of the policy and
objective of the Bayh-Dole Act.153 The policy and objective of the Act
are written with broad strokes, but the most relevant section is likely
the phrase “protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of
inventions.”154 Without clear regulations, however, businesses that

145. See Stephen Ezell, The Bayh-Dole Act’s Vital Importance to the U.S. Life-Sciences
Innovation System, ITIF: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION FOUNDATION (Mar.
4, 2019) https://itif.org/publications/2019/03/04/bayh-dole-acts-vital-importance-us-life-sciencesinnovation-system (explaining the significant role the Bayh-Dole Act plays in encouraging
commercialization and utilization of inventions).
146. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2018).
147. Id. § 203(a).
148. Id.
149. JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44597, MARCH-IN RIGHTS UNDER THE
BAYH-DOLE ACT 8 (2016).
150. Id. at 13.
151. Id.
152. Rights to Federally Funded Inventions and Licensing of Government Owned
Inventions, 86 Fed. Reg. 35 (proposed Dec. 31, 2020) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 401 and 404).
153. 37 C.F.R. § 401.6(g).
154. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2018).
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acquire patents eligible for march-in rights have expressed their
worries and reticence over the potential use of march-in rights in the
future.155
Finally, courts have refused to read a private right of action into the
Bayh-Dole Act,156 precluding any possible private enforcement
mechanisms for the Act. Because there is no explicit private right of
action, courts turned to legislative history—determining that the Act
primarily regulates the relationship between the government and
researchers and not private parties.157 Therefore, in the future, private
parties will be unable to use the Bayh-Dole Act in other private
litigation unless the statute is amended.
IV. AMENDING THE BAYH-DOLE ACT FOR PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
Congress should amend the Act to include an invitation for private
parties to enter the market and sue drug companies with
unconscionable pricing, in return receiving a license to manufacture
that drug at lower costs (the “Amendment”). This policy change would
lead to lower drug prices and solve the issues with march-in rights
inherent in the Bayh-Dole Act. By leaving the enforcement of the
march-in rights to the courts, Congress can avoid the need to regulate
each drug on the market and ensure stable interpretation of the Act
down the line. In the future, a manufacturer that enters the market with
a new brand name drug will have clear, enforceable precedent to create
a price ceiling to influence their pricing decisions. Although the Act
would invite increased litigation for drug manufacturers, potentially
leading to over-utilization of the courts, the number of suits can be
controlled through a first actor provision in the Amendment and the
inherent power of the court to punish private parties who pursue
frivolous suits.
First, Congress should amend the march-in rights provision of the

155. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., SPECIAL PUB. NO.
1234, RETURN ON INVESTMENT INITIATIVE TO ADVANCE THE PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT
AGENDA:
FINAL
GREEN
PAPER
32
(2019),
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.1234.pdf (finding stakeholders
believe the existing regulation is unclear regarding the federal government’s march-in rights,
leading to market uncertainty).
156. Madey v. Duke Univ., 413 F.Supp. 2d 601, 613 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (“[T]he Bayh-Dole Act
is designed to regulate the relationship between the Government and its funding recipients, but
it would not be available to a private third party as the basis for a private right of action or private
defense.”).
157. Id.
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Bayh-Dole Act to include more specific definitions and situations
where those rights should be exercised in private litigation, as well as
restrict the use of the march-in rights only to those drug companies with
unconscionable pricing. Congress should define what factors the court
should consider for a reasonableness analysis when determining
whether a specific drug company’s prices are unconscionable. When
setting out these factors, Congress should use a variety of mechanisms
to center drug pricing analysis around value to human life, and
especially for the march-in rights, the amount of public funding each
drug received during R&D.
One potential reasonableness measure would be to use the
European drug pricing control of assessing the added value of a new
drug compared with what is on the market to set a maximum price for
the new drug.158 A way to visualize this is through the Quality Added
Life Years (QALY) measure. By equating the additional QALYs each
drug creates above the previously available treatment, Congress can
create a guidepost for the courts to visualize how expensive a drug
should be relative to its benefit to consumers. A related consideration
would be the drug’s importance in treatment regimes or supply chains.
For example, insulin must be affordable not only because it saves lives,
but because its users need multiple doses per day.
One important limiting factor to the Amendment’s finding of
unconscionable drug pricing would be the inclusion of a statutory
factor that requires the court to weigh the amount of public funding
that was received for the creation of the patent. The Bayh-Dole Act
arguably over-captures those patents that are eligible for march-in
rights by declaring any patent that received any amount of public
funding may potentially be invaded.159 The purpose behind the
Amendment, however, is to recoup the investment the public has made
in these drug patents through taxpayer money—not to unduly punish
companies for competitive behavior. Therefore, the Amendment would
require a court’s reasonableness analysis to account for the amount of
public funding received for a specific patent. A drug manufacturer that
received nominal public funding during a drug’s development would
158. Marc A. Rodwin, What Can the United States Learn from Pharmaceutical Spending
COMMONWEALTH
FUND
(Nov.
11,
2019),
Controls
in
France?,
THE
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2019/nov/what-can-united-stateslearn-drug-spending-controls-france.
159. See 35 U.S.C. § 203 (defining the rights under the Bayh-Dole Act which allows nonprofit
organizations or small businesses to keep title to inventions when under a federal funding
agreement).
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have a stronger case to keep their drug prices high.
Notably, the Amendment would not regulate the field of all drugs,
but instead only target those drugs where the public has already
contributed to the drug’s R&D and so should benefit from its use on
the market. By tying reasonableness of pricing to the amount of federal
R&D money received, it would not encourage the government to
become a regulator in the free marketplace of pharmaceutical goods.
Rather, the Amendment would encourage private competitors to act
on behalf of the government to recoup sunk costs for research, without
double paying for both research and receipt of the final product.
The Amendment to the Act would also include a qui tam provision
similar to the FCA’s to invite private parties—more specifically
qualified competitor pharmaceutical companies with the
manufacturing capabilities to take on the march-in license—to sue on
behalf of the government. Unlike the FCA, which gives private parties
a fixed amount of the recovery in a qui tam suit,160 the litigant
pharmaceutical company here would only be rewarded a license for the
overpriced drug for a limited period of time,161 with renewal dependent
on the original pharmaceutical company’s revised pricing after the
duopoly period. The Amendment would also include a first actor
provision similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act, under which only the first
qualified pharmaceutical competitor could sue within a set period,
limiting the potential amount of litigation in the future.
The Amendment would also implement the solutions found to fix
the moral hazard issue in qui tam litigation by requiring the
government to approve any litigation, and further, to pre-screen
relators to ensure they have the manufacturing capabilities necessary
to properly compete in the field with the primary manufacturer. By
requiring this approval from the government, the Amendment would
ensure there will not be frivolous and time-wasting litigation.
Therefore, although a company’s drug pricing may be unconscionably
high, the Amendment would be designed to only challenge those drugs
that have a competitive manufacturer, thus decreasing the number of
drugs that can be challenged at one time while limiting the number of
frivolous and harassing lawsuits that could potentially be invited.

160. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2018).
161. It is beyond the scope of this Note to determine the ideal period of time for the
temporary license, however, the period of time should be enough to motivate the pharmaceutical
companies to litigate for the right to manufacture the drug.
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By empowering qui tam relators, the Amendment would ensure the
parties with the informational advantage, in this case a competitor in
the direct economic market, can participate in the litigation. Courts
generally do not have the institutional competence to make decisions
regarding complex pricing schemes such as drug pricing, lacking the
career economists who are often at the whim of Congress. Yet, through
qui tam litigation which would require a competitor in the field as the
relator, the Amendment ensures the parties in court will bring their
best arguments relating to the factors in the Amendment. Therefore,
the parties themselves will be incentivized to bring economists or
health experts before the court to convince the court of the
reasonableness, or unreasonableness, of the drug pricing—thus curing
some of the institutional limits of the court.
Another added benefit of the Amendment is that it would serve as
a potential case study to fix the uneven bargaining power in the
healthcare industry. Only actors with high bargaining power in an
economy can influence prices, meaning average U.S. citizens have no
bargaining power to influence drug prices. Theoretically, Medicare is
the health body with the most bargaining power in the United States
due to the sheer volume of payments related to Medicare patients.162
Although the government may soon give Medicare the ability to
negotiate directly for drug prices, the negotiation process would only
protect those patients covered by Medicare.163 By providing an avenue
for private enforcement that would regulate drug prices for all buyers
in the healthcare marketplace, the Amendment’s litigation would
artificially level the current imbalance in bargaining power in the
healthcare industry, thus effectively regulating the cost of drugs broadly
throughout the market.
Inviting ex post regulation of drug prices in the court means the
application of the Amendment will not be subject to the whims of
political parties as different actors rotate through federal agencies. By
delineating specific statutory factors and inviting litigation, the
Amendment would ensure stable and relatively uniform interpretation
of whether a given drug price is unconscionable. Although a drug
company could be open to new litigation avenues, the manufacturers

162. See Prescription Drug Prices: Harnessing Medicare’s Purchasing Power, THE CENTER
AMERICAN PROGRESS (Jan. 28, 2004), https://americanprogress.org/article/prescriptiondrug-prices-harnessing-medicares-purchasing-power/ (discussing Medicare’s purchasing power).
163. See Cubanski et al., supra note 54 (discussing H.R. 3 and Medicare negotiation under
the Biden administration).

FOR
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could also rely on the stable interpretations. In doing so, companies
could alter their competitive behavior in the marketplace, and any
inefficiencies caused by the litigation could be mitigated in the future
by encouraging companies to lower drug prices to avoid litigation
altogether.
At some point, the cost of a competitor challenging an
unconscionable drug price will be higher than any duopoly pricing they
may gain through a license. Manufacturing and distribution are
expensive endeavors for drug companies, and a rational company
would only seek a license when the potential profits make up the loss.
If a rational drug manufacturer, however, were to rely on the courts’
interpretation of the Amendment and accordingly price their drug at
or below the estimated unconscionable threshold, the risk of losing the
lawsuit would be too high for a rival manufacturer to want to litigate.
For the FCA, this would be seen as a failure of the private enforcement
mechanism to adequately bring forward informed parties. But here, the
decline in the number of lawsuits could be attributed to the decrease in
drug prices, and the successful implementation of the Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The United States healthcare industry has sky-rocketing drug
prices, and although there are many private enforcement mechanisms
surrounding the industry that regulate ex post as to fraud,
anticompetitive activity, and generic entry, no private enforcement
mechanism directly encourages private parties to litigate to lower drug
prices. Private enforcement mechanisms do not always function
properly—with risks of over-utilization and potential illegal
anticompetitive behavior as firms attempt to avoid private
enforcement. Nevertheless, private enforcement mechanisms generally
have been successful in both incentivizing private parties to regulate
industries ex post as well as making regulation easier than it would be
with only agency action.
Congress has already expressed intent to design mechanisms which
regulate patents created with public funding by building march-in
rights into the Bayh-Dole Act. Drug patents created with public
funding should be subject to a higher standard of regulation than drug
patents created without public funding to protect U.S. citizens from
double paying for both the development of and access to the drug.
Passing an Amendment to the Bayh-Dole Act that clearly defines when
march-in rights would be exercised and inviting private manufacturers
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to sue for the right to get a manufacturing license would create a system
of ex post regulation for drug prices without stifling innovation or
creating an unpredictable regulatory regime. Courts are experienced in
implementing reasonableness analyses, and with specified factors from
Congress, manufacturers could rely on a relatively stable form of
regulation and alter their economic behavior accordingly.
Overall, this solution is a moderate proposal that would affect the
behavior of a modest number of drug manufacturers. The Amendment,
however, would be a step forward to encourage tighter regulation of
drug prices and hopefully provide a model for other proposals down
the line. Although the Amendment is specifically tied to the Bayh-Dole
Act to temper the risks of over-utilization, a more expansive private
enforcement mechanism that affects all drug companies could be
implemented in the future. Regulating drug prices to reduce market
inefficiencies in the healthcare industry will lead to more lives saved.

